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Summary: As a social science, economics cannot be reduced to simply an a
priori science or an ideology. In addition economics cannot be solely an empiri-
cal or a historical science. Economics is a research field which studies only one
dimension of human behavior, with the four fields of mathematics, economet-
rics, ethics and history intersecting one another. The purpose of this paper is to
discuss the two parts of the proposition above, in connection with the contro-
versies surrounding the method and the scope of economics: economics as an
applied mathematics and economics as a predictive/empirical science. 
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“If self-interested individual behaviour can (as if by an ‘invisible 
hand’) generate economic efficiency, then why couldn’t the self-or -
professionally-interested behaviour of scientists also (given the 
right institutions) produce epistemic efficiency?” 
   
 (Wade D. Hands 2001, p. 56) 
 
 
The scope and method of economics are separate, but related, fields of economics as 
a social science. Economists often define their discipline as “economics is what 
economists do”. Over the course of its two hundred and fifty year long history, eco-
nomics has providedg explanation and prediction about human behavior and offered 
policy prescriptions. Throughout this development economics has experienced sev-
eral shifts in it’s scope and its subject matter.  
During this period the methodology of economics, which can be defined as the 
study of setting up the rules (protocol) to decide upon economic thoughts or theories, 
the objects of economics, and if such theories are scientific or not, has exerted an 
ongoing development. While normative methodological approach in economics has 
inquired on how economists must/should make economics, positive methodological 
approach has questioned how economists actually make economics. In brief, the de-62  Turan Yay and Huseyin Tastan 
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velopment of the relation between the scope and the method of economics is an inter-
related historical process. 
The main hypothesis of this paper argues that as a social science economics 
cannot be reduced to only an a priori science or ideology. Moreover, economics is 
neither a purely empirical science nor solely a historical study. Economics is a re-
search field which studies only one dimension of human behavior where these four 
fields, mathematics, econometrics, ethics and history intersect one another each 
other. This hypothesis is based on the view that the “judicious pluralism” approach, 
which has emerged from the recent developments in the methodology of economics, 
is applicable to the scope of economics as well. In other words, especially in recent 
years, as the recent literature on the economics of science is expanding, the applica-
tion of Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand” to the process of “making economics” 
can potentially be very fruitful. What we need is necessary is only professional eth-
ics; that is, everyone is attempting to make his/her best. The pre-condition for the 
increased level of interaction of economics with other disciplines is first to constitute 
a tradition of communication and discussion among economists specialized in differ-
ent fields of economics. 
From the 1970s to the 2000s, there have been two major strands of criticisms 
against mainstream economics: the critics of formalism and the Post Autistic Eco-
nomics. The foundations underlying the Post Autistic Economics, which mainly 
criticizes the “education of economics”, in recent years are closely related to the 
criticisms raised against the so-called formalist revolution during the 1940s and 
1950s that have changed the way of “making economics” (Terence Hutchison 1992; 
Mark Blaug 2003; Edward Fullbrook 2004). The neoclassical or mainstream eco-
nomics, with its structure that uses excessive abstract and inner-consistent mathe-
matical models, does not help us to understand or to explain the real world. Also, 
Post Autistic Economics never suggests an alternative economics but advocates em-
piricism instead of priorism and critical thinking instead of ideology (Fullbrook 
2004, pp. 4-5). These are the fundamental points which must be discussed by econo-
mists.Is it possible to purify economics from a priori qualifications and transform it 
into an empirical science? How can we interpret the idea of economics as a critical 
approach instead of the idea of economics as an ideology? Can we say that “neoclas-
sical economics is equivalent to ideology?” If the answer to the last question is “yes”, 
is this due to a priori nature of economics? If every economic approach is an ideol-
ogy, then where do we go from there? Several questions can be raised similar to 
these. 
Naturally, attempting to address all of the questions raised above would push 
the limits of a journal article. Therefore, in this paper we focus only on the relation-
ship between economics and mathematics and econometrics/statistics: Can econom-
ics be reduced to applied mathematics or merely a predictive/empirical science? Or 
to put it differently, can economists abandon mathematics and/or economet-
rics/statistics?
1  
                                                        
1 In this article, we do not consider the relationship between economics and ideology (or ethics/political 
philosophy) and also the relationship between economics and history.  63  Invisible Hand in the Process of Making Economics or on the Method and Scope of Economics 
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If we attempted to answer these questions without properly taking time per-
spective into account, we would miss an important point: There is no word unspoken 
under the blue sky. In other words, any discussion of methodological aspects of mak-
ing economics, without regard to historical perspective associated with the practice 
of economics, will ultimately fail. For this reason, in this paper we will attempt to 
apply the principle stated by (borrowing from Philip Mirowski 1989, p. 8) Emile 
Meyerson: “the best way to talk about science is to examine how scientist have done 
it” to making economics and attempt to answer the questions above in a historical 
and methodological perspective.  
The plan of the paper is as follows; Section one covers a general evaluation of 
the methodological controversies in economics for the last thirty years. The follow-
ing two sections deal with the place of mathematics and econometrics in economics 
respectively. 
  
1. Developments in the Methodology of Economics since the 
1980s    
 
The methodology of economics has experienced important changes, transformations 
and developments in the period from the 1980s to the present, which is now called 
the Renaissance of the methodology of economics. In addition, to expanding scope of 
economics and increasing number of scholars in the field, there have been two 
changes related to the purpose of this paper. The first one is the transformation in the 
nature of economic methodology. The second one is the rising importance of eco-
nomic approach in methodological discussions. 
 
1.1 Changes in the Nature of Economic Methodology  
 
Prior to the 1980s the methodological problems which economists meet in practice 
used to be solved by the application of certain methodological approaches, for exam-
ple, the logical positivism or to Karl Popper. In that period, the fundamental problem 
of the methodology of economics was to find the true and unique set of rules for 
making economics more scientific. However today, the attitude of the majority of 
economists on this approach is to give up on these monist approaches, which try to 
find a true unique rule to decide whether theories of economics are scientific or not, 
or which is the best theory among several available economic theories. We can say 
that, the idea that scientific theories can be compared and contrasted in connection 
with a unique rule without subjective value judgments (i.e. Popperian falsification-
ism) has been falsified since the Duhem-Quinn thesis (see Rod Cross 1994). This 
implication is valid not only for economics but also for science in general, or phi-
losophy of science (Mirowski 1989, p. 356; Sheila C. Dow 2001; Hands 2001). 
Since the 1980s, an important transformation has been observed in the litera-
ture of economic methodology. While the descriptive-positive approaches have been 
adopted over the prescriptive-normative approaches, various methodological ap-
proaches have been brought forward. These include the ideas of Imre Lakatos, Tho-
mas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, the deductive methodology of John Stuart Mill 
(Hausman), as well as the different interpretations of Karl Popper (Blaug or Boland), 64  Turan Yay and Huseyin Tastan 
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Deirdre N. McCloskey’s rhetorical approach to the critical realism and the different 
versions of apriorism (Misesian or M.Hollis-E.Nell’ approaches). In other words, the 
reaction of the methodologists of economics to the foundationalism which advocates 
that the practice of making economics must be based on the methodological rules 
suggested by philosophers of science, has swung them to the other extreme: relativ-
ism or using the phrase from Feyerabend,“anything goes”. Although during the be-
ginning years of this transformation the tolerance suggested by the post-modern ap-
proach has been particularly attractive for scientists, after some time, it has been sug-
gested that pure relativism is not only useful but also dangerous for the development 
of science. Because of this, the majority of methodologists of economics define their 
own place/position in methodological discussions as a place between foundational-
ism and relativism (Dow 2001; Hands 2001). 
According to this approach, which we call it as judicious pluralism, a scientist 
chooses one of the available approaches (paradigms or research programs) subjec-
tively and narrows his or her research field. In this regard, the important point is that 
every approach must be aware of other approaches studying in the same research 
field. In our opinion the interactions among various approaches and their de facto or 
potential competitions would increase the productivities of these approaches and 
would lead to the improvement of science. In this framework, what is expected from 
methodology of economics is to determine the reasons for the diversities among 
various approaches and to determine how we arrived to the available state. By this 
means, economists from different areas of specialization will have an opportunity to 
evaluate the merits of their own approach and others’ approaches, and see the advan-
tages and disadvantages associated with them. This process of interaction, communi-
cation and discussion will ultimately result in leaping progress in science. 
 
1.2 Increased Importance of Economic Approach in Methodology and 
Philosophy of Science 
 
Since the 1980s, the underlying forces behind the positive growth trend of the litera-
ture on the methodology of economics can be depicted as follows: 
 
  Failure of the neoclassical synthesis approach of macroeconomics to solve 
the stagflation crisis of the 1970s in the real world has led to the crisis in 
the world realm of theoretical economics. In the wake of this crisis, hoping 
to unveil the causes, economists have turned to the theoretical and meth-
odological origins of their approach and studied the ideas of the leading 
philosophers of science like Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend in a 
relatively short period. Thus, with the help of ideas of philosophers of sci-
ence, they have tried to understand the crisis of economics, and to solve the 
controversies among various alternative schools in economics, as well as to 
explain the development trend of the history of economic thought; 
  In this context, upon closer examination of the positivist and Popperian 
prescriptive approaches, economists have arrived to the conclusion that 
some economists in the past have had similar and important methodologi-
cal ideas (for example Joseph A. Schumpeter) and hence there is no need 65  Invisible Hand in the Process of Making Economics or on the Method and Scope of Economics 
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to seek the help of the philosophy of science; [McCloskey’s rhetorical eco-
nomics and Hausman’s (Millian) economics as inexact science] 
  The historical studies on methodology and philosophy of science have 
shown that economists had already taken part at the start of methodological 
controversies, as opposed to joining some time later. For example, there 
were many economists or social scientists in the Vienna Circle which laid 
the foundation of positivism in the 20
th century (Oscar Morgenstern 1976; 
Gerhard Schwödiauer 1987; Thomas E. Uebel 1991; David Edmonds and 
John Eidinow 2004; Giandomenica Becchio 2005); 
  Finally, although social scientists have tried to explain the process of scien-
tific knowledge by the sociology of science (Kuhn), rather than imitating 
natural sciences for a long period, they have recently begun to explain this 
process by the economics of science (Paula E. Stephan 1996; Mirowski 
and Esther M. Sent 2002). 
 
The implications from the recent developments in the methodology of eco-
nomics summarized above can be stated as follows: The approach suggested for the 
methodology of economics, “judicious pluralism”, can also be equally applied to the 
scope of economics. The scope of economics is extremely diverse, where although 
some economists deal with mathematical economics, some others deal with empirical 
economics. While a group of economists questions the ethical foundations of welfare 
economics, yet another group studies economic history. In the framework of recent 
philosophy of science, it is not possible to determine the superiority of one study (or 
area) to another. For example, how do we compare a game theoretical study on hu-
man behavior with a pure econometric study or a study on economic history? We 
believe that, rather than focusing only one or two dimensions (among mathematical 
economics, econometrics, welfare economics and economic history) and excluding 
others, each branch in economics, instead, should attempt to achieve the best within 
its boundaries and then discuss, interact and cooperate with the other fields of study. 
This would ultimately help make economics a more rigorous and more reliable social 
science. Furthermore, to support this proposition we need to focus on the history (or 
archeology) of economics and to determine how we have got here. 
 
2. Economics as an A Priori Science or the Relationship between 
Economics and Mathematics  
  
First we must emphasize that an a priori science does not mean mathematical eco-
nomics. After the acceptance of the view that Popperian methodology is not proper 
for economics by the majority of economists, several approaches advocating that 
economics could not be a science, such as physics, have gained importance: Misesian 
apriorism (Ludwig von Mises 1962, 1998, 2003), deductive approach of Martin 
Hollis and Edward Nell (1975) and Daniel M. Hausman’s (1992) “economics as an 
inexact science”. 
Our specific aim is to question the process of the formalization, or the trans-
formation of economics to an applied mathematics. Thus, the main question which 
we will try to answer can be stated as follows: If formalization of economics means 66  Turan Yay and Huseyin Tastan 
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the abstraction = axiomatization = mathematization = being rigorous science, why 
are the majority of economists disturbed? (Roy E. Weinraub 1999, p. 72)  
When we look at the literature related with our discussion we see many pro-
ponents and opponents of mathematization of economics. Although mathematical 
economist Paul A. Samuelson (1994, p. 267 and 272) states that “It is confirmed that 
what I predicted more than four decades ago-that the virus of mathematics would 
spread in economics and cause grave psychological discomfort in those scholars 
who lag behind the external-margin frontier of its extreme cultivation (…) Science 
advances funeral by funeral”. We consider believe that his statement must be con-
sidered with regards to the two sides: While there are mathematical economists 
thinking like Samuelson, there are also several mathematical economists (Wassily 
Leontief 1971; Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen 1979; Michio Morishima 1991) who do 
not agree with him. The question of “how much mathematics should be in econom-
ics” cannot be handled in a healthy and constructive way if we disregard the histori-
cal perspective.
2 We have to find the answers to three questions: What are the criti-
cisms against mathematization of economics? What are the main ideas of the propo-
nents of mathematization/formalization of economics? How can we evaluate the 
formalization of economics from the perspective of economic methodology?  
During the twentieth century at least seven major criticisms to the mathemati-
zation of economics have been raised. These can be summarized as follows (Herbert 
G. Grubel and Lawrence A. Boland 1986; Clive Beed and Owen Kane 1991):  
 
  The axioms of mathematical economics do not correspond with real world 
behavior; 
  The number of empirically testable hypotheses generated by mathematical 
economics is small compared with the volume of mathematical economic 
analysis; 
  Some /much of economics is not naturally quantitative and therefore does 
not lend itself to mathematical exposition; 
  The translation of the description of economic processes from a natural 
language (such as English) to mathematics can be naïve and illegitimate; 
  There is no objective way to gauge whether mathematical economics is 
more precise than less mathematical economics; 
                                                        
2 It would be fruitless to evaluate the merits of mathematization of economics without a historical pers-
pective. In their survey Munir Quddus and Salim Rashid (1994) cite the views of a famous mathematical 
economist, P. Samuelson. Samuelson thinks that most economists are uncomfortable with the spread of 
the virus of mathematics in economics and he advocates the view that “economists do not understand 
mathematics” is wrong. Thus, he arrives the conclusion that the opponents of high mathematization of 
economics are those who do not understand it. On the other hand, in reply to O. Morgenstern’s question 
of how he finds the mathematics of Samuelson, the founder of game theory and one of the leading ma-
thematicians of the 20
th century von Neuman replies “[Samuelson] has murky ideas about stability. He is 
no mathematician and one should not credit him with analysis. And even in 30 years he won't absorb 
game theory” (Robert J. Leonard 1994, p. 494). Furthermore, Deirdre N. McCloskey (1985) says that 
mathematics in economics is mostly rhetoric and this makes economics very unrealistic, thus advocates 
that the individual in economics should be replaced with someone real like, for example, the novel he-
roine Madam Bovary. In response to McCloskey, Mirowski (1988), borrowing from Julian Barnes says: 
“Madam Bovary is not real a novel heroine, a fictional character not existing in reality.” Then, where is 
the truth? Beyond fiction how do we produce scientific knowledge about human behavior? 67  Invisible Hand in the Process of Making Economics or on the Method and Scope of Economics 
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  There is no one “best” system of mathematical logic; 
  Because of all the above problems, mathematics is often an unnecessary 
adornment to economic discovery about the real world, but serves other 
purposes.     
 
On the other hand, we can summarize the ideas of economists (Samuelson, 
Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu) who have made significant contributions to 
the mathematization of economics in the 20
th century as follows: 
According to Samuelson (1952, p. 52), mathematics is a language, a commu-
nication tool. All of the scientific disciplines need deduction because it has the mod-
est linguistic role of translating certain empirical hypotheses into their “logical 
equivalents”: 
 
 “What is not always so clearly understood is that a literary statement (…) has its 
complete equivalent in the symbolism of mathematical logic. If we write out (our 
propositions) in such symbolism, we may save paper, ink and time”
3 
 
But the more important function of mathematics argued by Samuelson is that 
(1952, p. 61):  
 
“not to produce a truth by mathematics that could not have been proved by words; 
(but) to produce one that has not, as a matter of historical fact, been previously pro-
duced by words. I suggest that a careful review of the literature since the 1870’s will 
show that a significant part of all truths since arrived at have in fact been product of 
theorists who use symbolic techniques.” 
   
Economist Arrow argues that two propositions of social scientists on mathe-
matics seem to be based on nothing more than a misunderstanding: First, although 
mathematical/quantitative analysis is useful for physical sciences, social sciences call 
for qualitative analysis. Second, the judgment and intuition of the skilled investigator 
are fundamentally more useful in the social sciences than mathematical formulas 
based on quantitative observations. The answer of Arrow to these propositions can be 
stated as follows: Mathematics with all branches is not quantitative in nature, espe-
cially mathematical or symbolic logic is purely qualitative and can be used in social 
sciences. There are two advantages of using mathematical methods in social sci-
ences. In the first place, it provides clarity of thought. Secondly, the explicit formula-
tion of theories in mathematical terms assists the empirical verification of theories 
(Arrow 1951). 
According to Arrow a mathematical model of social behavior can be con-
structed via an individualistic activity function which represents behavior and im-
pulse of an economic agent to other individuals/agents, and changes in external con-
ditions. One can handle the rationality of an individual, one of the pillars of econom-
ics, in an optimization framework or in a strategical model or game theory frame-
                                                        
3 Again in Samuelson (1952, p. 58) words “I should hate to put six monkeys in the British Museum and 
wait until they had typed out in words the equivalent of the mathematical formulas involved in White-
head and Russell’s Mathematical Principia. But if we were to wait to wait long enough it could be done.”    68  Turan Yay and Huseyin Tastan 
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work as in the works of von Neumann and Morgenstern in which every social and 
individual outcome is dependent on the others’ decisions (Arrow 1951).  
Economist Debreu (1984) lists several benefits of axiomatization of economic 
theory:  
 
  Making the assumptions of an economic model as explicit as possible en-
ables us to evaluate the extent to which it applies in specific situations; 
  Axiomatization may provide ready answers to new questions when a novel 
interpretation is discovered; 
  By stressing mathematical rigor axiomatization leads to deeper understand-
ing of the problems economists are studying; 
  It provides a firm basis from which new approaches can be established; 
  Due to simplicity and generality it makes theories more aesthetic, easily 
understandable and applicable to a broad class of problems; 
  Furthermore, being an efficient means of communication axiomatization 
enables economists to communicate with each other easily and effectively.  
 
According to Debreu the assessment of the state of economic theory and the 
critiques of mathematization of economics requires a detailed analysis of how we got 
in here in the first place. In this regard the process of mathematization of economics 
after the World War II consists of several “accidents” (Debreu 1986). The main fac-
tor behind the mathematization of economics is that theoretical physics was set as the 
unapproachable ideal before this transformation process. According to Debreu, the 
interaction of physics and mathematics enabled physics to find ready answers to its 
real-world problems from the abstract world of mathematics. Physics was able to 
resist the pressure of mathematization by resorting to natural experiments and factual 
observations so that it established a balance whereas economics was not able to fol-
low the same path. Since the experimental/empirical part of economics is not suffi-
ciently sound, economists tend to put more weight on internal consistency and logi-
cal structure of their models. Thus, mathematics plays an important role in reducing 
the potential errors in deductive reasoning of economics to a minimum. 
  
2.1 Controversy on Formalization of Economics 
 
The first complaint about the formalism in economics is related with the image of 
economics in public opinion. First of all, formalism has created an obstacle for non-
economists and students willing to communicate with economics. This non-existence 
of communication originates not only from the difficulties caused by mathematical 
techniques in economics but also the transition of economics to a form which has no 
relation with real economy (Dow 1998, p. 1826). Similarly, criticisms associated 
with formalization of economics after World War II have focused on the transition of 
economics into a science which includes inner-consistent models like mathematics 
but which does not include testable hypotheses and inferences (Leontief 1971; 
Hutchison 1992). 
The second important criticism is related with the rhetoric of mathematical 
formalism of economics. McCloskey is not against the use of mathematics but to the 
quality of mathematics in economics. According to McCloskey, “Economics has 69  Invisible Hand in the Process of Making Economics or on the Method and Scope of Economics 
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made progress without mathematics, but has made faster progress with it. Mathemat-
ics has brought transparency to many hundreds of economic arguments. The ideas of 
economics –the metaphor of the production function, the story of economic growth, 
the logic of competition, and the facts of labor-force participation– would rapidly 
become muddled without mathematical expression.” (McCloskey 1994, p. 128). 
McCloskey who takes formal mathematics as “abstract and pure mathematics” 
stated that economists must choose the kind of mathematics suitable for themselves: 
In this regard, not mathematics (and its pure mathematics) but physics (and its ap-
plied mathematics) must be taken by economists as a model for themselves 
(McCloskey 1985). According to Weinraub, this criticism of McCloskey is based on 
his unawareness of the changing meaning of a good mathematical proposal (Wein-
raub 2002, pp. 73-74). 
The point above stated by Weinraub directs us to the history of interaction be-
tween economics and mathematics in order to understand the process of formaliza-
tion of economics. This process, at the same time, falsifies the view stated by Debreu 
that the formalization of economics is a natural conclusion of the fact that the two 
main concepts in economics, price and quantity are measurable (Debreu 1984, 1991). 
First of all, the view that “the more formalized, more abstracted and more 
axiomatic economics is more reliable and rigorous and the opposite of this is not 
rigorous” is not a true or accepted proposition for all times. It is a historical (not 
ahistorical) proposition (Weinraub 1998, p. 1840; Weinraub 2002): 
 
“For most economic theorists today to formalize means to axiomatise, and thereby to 
make rigorous. My main assertion (….) is that an argument is ahistorical, and there-
fore probably wrong on most interpretations.”   
 
In the beginning of twentieth century, for the applied mathematical theoreti-
cians like Vito Volterra, Henry Poincare, Albert Einstein, the meaning of “a rigorous 
mathematical model of a phenomena” was that a mathematical model must have di-
rect and obvious implications based on empirical facts and must have testable impli-
cations. The opposite of “being a rigorous” or “formal” model was not being infor-
mal but rather “unconstrained”. This approach, which is based on Newtonian phys-
ics in the beginning of the 20
th century, was also adopted by important economists in 
France (like Dupuit and Cournot) and England (Jevons Marshall, Edgeworth). 
However, in order to better understand the formalization of economics it will 
be useful to look at the real history of the developments in mathematics, physics and 
philosophy of science. In this context, one must mention the Vienna Circle which 
was founded by a group of mathematicians, physicists, philosophers and social scien-
tists. The Vienna Circle, founded by Moritz Schlick (philosopher), Hans Hahn 
(mathematician) and Otto Neurath (sociologist, social scientist) had very influential 
members in almost every discipline that shaped the intellectual and scientific world 
in the twentieth century: Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Friedrich Wiseman, Kurt 
Gödel, Abraham Wald, Karl Menger, Victor Kraft, Herbert Feigl, Felix Kaufmann. 
Its members have named themselves as “Scientific World Concept: the Vienna Cir-
cle”, and they have tried to demarcate physics (science) from metaphysics (non-
science) and intended to combine logic and empiricism in order to provide logical 70  Turan Yay and Huseyin Tastan 
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base for science. In other words, it was a “Unified Science System/Encyclopedia” 
project. Two of the most important philosophers of the 20
th century, Karl Popper and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein have been closely connected with the members of the Vienna 
Circle (Sigmund 1995; Edmonds and Eidinow 2004). 
During this period, while the members of the Vienna Circle were assembling 
philosophical meetings under the chairmanship of Schlick; Karl Menger, who was a 
member of the Circle and son of Carl Menger - the founder of Austrian School of 
Economics Carl Menger, was organizing conferences on mathematics (Karl 
Menger’s Colloquium). Vienna was so famous that it had been called Mecca of 
mathematical logic. In these meetings many mathematicians and logicians from the 
entire world have given lectures: from Poland Alfred Tarski, American Willard van 
Orman Quine, German Carl Hempel (Sigmund 1995), etc. At the same time, the Vi-
enna Circle which proudly named Albert Einstein, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ber-
trand Russel as entellectual fathers, was in touch with several famous mathematicians 
of this period, like German (from Gottingen University) David Hilbert, Dutch (from 
Amsterdam University) L.E.J. Brouwer. 
On the other hand, this period was also the crisis period of crisis for mathe-
matics. There were three mathematical approaches in competition (Weinraub 1998, 
2002): 
 
  Logicians: Attempted to show the importance and the power of logical and 
critical approach by making irrevocable deductions from certain axioms 
and definitions. According to mathematician Frege, numbers were logical 
objects that exist independent of human definition and it was possible to 
reduce the laws of numbers to logic. Moreover, Principia Mathematica of 
Whitehead and Russell was the most significant attempt for the reducibility 
of mathematics into logic. 
  Formalists: Were known for their skill to tackle a given problem in a for-
mal way and to reformulate it as a concrete algorithm. According to D. 
Hilbert of Gottingen University, who may be noted as the founder of the 
approach, mathematics consists of formal objects that can be interpreted 
and reformulated as one may wish. Hilbert contended that formalization as 
axiomatization was directly linked with discovering and establishing 
mathematical and scientific knowledge. The purpose of formalization, 
modeling or constructing theories for a given phenomenon was not to es-
tablish the link between the model and experimental data, but to develop a 
series of inner-consistent logical chains and thus to discover new scientific 
knowledge.  
  Intuitionists: Leader of this approach, which who emphasized the impor-
tance of geometric intuition in every branch of mathematics, was Dutch 
mathematician L.E.J Brouwer from Amsterdam University. He argued that 
mathematical objects should be constructed and perceived as well-defined 
and finitistic structures.  
 
It is interesting to note that towards the end of 19
th century, the mathematiza-
tion of economics in order to form a scientific foundation for economics, was per-71  Invisible Hand in the Process of Making Economics or on the Method and Scope of Economics 
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ceived by economists as imaging of rational mechanics or as an effort to constitute 
resemblance between structure of economics and the concepts of mechanics like 
power, energy, equilibrium and stability and their empirical counterparts. But in the 
first quarter of the 20
thcentury, while the form of the making mathematics was chang-
ing, the relativity theory and quantum physics superseded the physics of 19
th century. 
These developments changed both the form of making/producing scientific knowl-
edge and the relationship between mathematics and natural sciences. 
According to mathematical economist Weinraub (2002), the architect of this 
change was German mathematician David Hilbert. The aims of formalists in the 
1920s, has been found in the two parts of the Hilbert’s Formalist Program: Finitistic 
Program for the Foundations of Arithmetic and Axiomatic Approach. 
The first part of the Hilbert’s Program was related to the form of making 
mathematics, or the perception of mathematics, and was defined as establishment of 
consistent system, logic or set theory. In other words, this part of the program is re-
lated to, firstly, the problem of the solubility of every mathematical problem, and 
secondly, the problem of the quality of a mathematical proof and the determination 
of the rules of mathematical provability. Furthermore, according to Hilbert, mathe-
matical knowledge as a whole, with the help of a few axioms, can be produced as an 
axiomatic system which is both inner-consistent and complete and the system can be 
reformulated as a whole of verified propositions by adding a new consistent axiom. 
A system formed in this manner is either true or false, otherwise it is not complete. In 
other words, the essence of formalization/axiomatization of mathematics relies on the 
idea that “truth of every system implies consistency of the system as a whole”. For 
example, in a two-person game, theory will be arithmetically true (consistent) due to 
deterministic logic (as the outcome will be true if the assumptions are true). In a 
sense, this means that the truth of a model is related to its inner-consistency.  
According to Hilbert not only mathematical propositions, but also develop-
ment of an idea or a theory, which that can be an object of scientific thought require 
its foundations to be based on axiomatic method, i.e., mathematics. At the same time 
this idea is the basis for the second part of Hilbert’s program: Axiomatic Approach. 
According to this approach, mathematicians should develop mathematical structures 
which can be suitable basis for models in applied sciences (electrodynamics, radia-
tion, thermodynamics, gravity, quantum theory, etc.). In this way, instead of scien-
tific knowledge process which is perceived as constructing models reduced to me-
chanical structures in the 19
th century, a process of model construction reduced to 
mathematical structures was being advocated. 
The first part of Hilbert’s program, the project to prove that “mathematics is a 
consistent and complete axiomatic system”, was reputed by “inconsistency” and “in-
completeness” (or impossibility) theorems published in 1931 by Czech mathemati-
cian and a member of Vienna circle Kurt Godel (Jerry P. King 2004, pp. 36-37). 
While Godel’s theorems caused disappointment in Russel’s logicist-mathematicist 
approach in which mathematics is perceived as the totality of logical deductions, they 
led to the defeat of Hilbert’s first program and the removal of logic from “the center 
of mathematician’s world” (Weinraub 2002, p. 94; King 2004, p. 37).  72  Turan Yay and Huseyin Tastan 
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Furthermore, Godel’s theorems did not affect the second part of the Hilbert’s 
Program (axiomatic approach), a project aiming to prove that all sciences can be con-
structed based on axiomatic-mathematical foundations. However, as mathematics 
and therefore scientific knowledge is not the only way to establish reliability, accu-
racy and truth, it eventually has led to the widespread adoption of the idea that 
mathematical truth changes with mathematical approach: mathematical relativism.  
The reflection of these developments in the history of mathematics on eco-
nomics could perhaps not be stated better than Professor Weinraub (2002, p. 100):    
 
“Thus we have the split, looking ahead to today from the early decades of this century, 
between those who would argue that mathematical rigor (and scientific knowledge) 
must develop not from axioms but from observations (about the economy) and (eco-
nomic) data, so that the truth of a theory or model may be tested or confirmed by real-
ity -like Volterra, Pareto and Edgeworth- and those who would claim that mathemati-
cal (economic) models are rigorous (and “true” in the only useful scientific sense of 
the world) if they are built on a cogent axiom base –like von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, and Debreu. The arguments about formalism in economics thus recapitulate di-
vergent views about, and changing meanings of, scientific knowledge. Our archae-
ology of formalism in economics unearths increasingly energetic and successful chal-
lenges to certain more or less traditional or standard views about scientific 
truth/knowledge, and the development of more or less successful alternatives in vari-
ous quarters: the strata are the emergent re-conceptualizations of both science and 
knowledge. In concrete terms, there is indeed a disjunction between Debreu’s The 
Theory of Value and Friedman and Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United 
States 1867-1960: although both are mathematically rigorous, the latter is rigorous in 
an older sense, the former in the newer sense. This is one source of the divergence be-
tween econometrics and mathematical economics.” 
 
In this framework, following Debreu and Weinraub, we can point some re-
markable developments in the formalization process of economics. 
If the “symbolic” birth year of mathematical economics was the published year 
of the book, An Investigation on the Mathematical Principles of Wealth Theory by A. 
Cournot, the symbolic starting year of the contemporary mathematical period in eco-
nomics is 1944 when The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was published. 
While the important names of the first wave were Leon Walras (1834-1910) Vilfredo 
Pareto (1848-1923) and Francis Y. Edgeworth (1845-1926), the names and studies of 
the second wave, which triggered the deep and important changes in economics, 
were as follows: In addition to the book written by von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
the input-output analysis of W. Leontief, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Paul 
Samuelson, activity analysis of production of T. Koopmans and simplex algoritm of 
G. Dantzing. Of course the workings of Cowles Commission must be added to the 
list. During the mathematization and formalization process of economics which be-
gan in the 1940s the Cowles Commission, which can be considered as the organic 
continuation of the Vienna Circle in Austria, was very influential. Both of the mem-
bers of the group who studied on general equilibrium theory (Oscar Lange, Jacop 
Mosak, Ragnar Frisch, R.G.D. Allen, Abba Lerner, Leonid Marschak, Tjalling 
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Nicholas Georgeescu-Roegen) and the group who studied on econometrics (Ragnar 
Frisch, Gerhard Tintner, Trygve Haavelmo, Lawrence Klein and Abraham Wald) 
played primary role in this process (Debreu 1984; Carl F. Christ 1994). 
Main motives of these studies were the investigation of the general equilib-
rium theory, its transformation to more strengthened, generalized and simplified 
forms, and the extension to new directions. These include solving numerous prob-
lems in the theories of choice, utility and demand and using new mathematical tech-
niques. The aim of the Walras’s mathematical theory was to explain the equilibrium 
between the actions of agents participating in commodity markets as interconnected 
with each other and the vector of prices. In equilibrium, while every producer maxi-
mizes his profit according to the price vector in his production set, every consumer 
satisfies his preference under the budget constraint and total demand equals total 
supply for every good. Walras and his followers have thought that the model would 
be incomplete without a proposal which support the existence of equilibrium and 
they have tried to fill this gap with the mathematical assumption that the number of 
equations equals number of variables.  
The important cornerstones in the process of replacement of the proof of Ar-
row-Debreu model instead of above assumption can be stated as follows: 
 
  The first model which proposes solution to the existence of equilibrium 
was the 1936-1937 model of mathematician Abraham Wald; 
  The 1937 growth model by John von Neumann in which the fixed point 
theorem of Shizuo Kakutani, a student of mathematician Hilbert, was used;  
  The arrival of Oscar Morgenstern to Princeton University who was a 
member of the Vienna Circle and has been studying business cycles, statis-
tics and the idea that perfect foresight was a paradox in general equilibrium 
theory and the publishing of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
(1944), coauthored with von Neumann, which laid the foundations of 
Game Theory; 
  The joining of G. Debreu to Cowles Commission who was trained in 
French Burbaki School of Mathematics which adopted the formalist 
mathematical approach of Hilbert and the proofs basic theorems of Welfare 
economics together with K.J. Arrow; 
  The publishing of 1950 article of John Nash who widened the Kakutani 
theorem to the proof of the “Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games”; 
  And finally, the proof of general equilibrium by Arrow-Debreu in 1954 by 
generalizing Nash's results. 
 
In the beginning of the 1950s, according to Debreu, it was time to provide a 
formal proof of general equilibrium. Independent from Arrow-Debreu, Lionel 
McKenzie and David Gale proved the existence of equilibrium (for details on this 
topic see Debreu 1984, 1986, 1991; Weinraub 2002).  
In fact, fundamental problematic of general equilibrium should be interpreted 
as an attempt by mathematical economists to provide a theoretical framework for A. 
Smiths’s invisible hand (independent rational decision making of agents in an econ-
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several basic economic problems such as efficient allocation of resources, noncentral 
decision making, incentives of decision makers and the nature and the role of infor-
mation in economy (Arrow 1972; Debreu 1984).  
According to Debreu, economics is far from creating a Grand Unified The-
ory
4 but instead it appears as an entirety of small theories each focusing on certain 
economic problems one by one. Nevertheless, it provided solutions to a wide range 
of aspects of the economic system. One of the leading was theoretical explanations 
developed for the functions of prices, where solutions are found for the function of 
efficient allocation of resources using results from convex analysis, for the function 
of equating demand and supply using results from fixed point theorems and the func-
tion of avoiding the formation of destabilizing coalitions (or instabilities) using re-
sults from integration theory and non-standard analysis (Debreu 1991, p. 3).  
On the other hand, mathematical economists argue that developments in game 
theory have led to significant improvements in the scope of economics, where eco-
nomics has evolved from a social science focusing on the problem of production and 
allocation of resources, into a science studying the analysis of incentives of individu-
als in every social institution. In this regard, non-cooperative game theory, in particu-
lar, was seen as an important turning point in the evolution of economics and social 
sciences. Beginning with A. Smith economic theory has developed a sound formal 
analytical structure using linear algebra methods for the problem of price-quantity in 
commodity allocation space and with Nash it has further expanded into the analysis 
of individual incentives (rational competitive behavior) in market as well as non-
market institutions (Roger B. Myerson 1999, p. 1080). Expansion of the research 
domain of economics took place together with the change in the functional purpose 
of social sciences: economics as a social science aiming at studying social institu-
tions and evaluation of institutional reform proposals instead of abstract intuition 
associated with human behavior (Myerson 1999, p. 1069). 
 
3. Economics as an Empirical Science  
 
“Empirical macroeconomists are engaged in several promising lines of work. They 
are also engaged in making strained analogies between their work and the natural 
sciences and in classifying work in styles other than their own as outdated or mistaken 
based on its methods, not its substance. Since there is also a tendency in the profession 
to turn away from all technically demanding forms of theorizing and data analysis to 
focus a lot of negative energy on each other. All the lines of work described (…) are 
potentially useful, and the lines of work show some tendency to converge. We would be 
better off if we spent more time in reading each others' work and less in thinking up 
grand excuses for ignoring it.” (Christopher A. Sims 1996, p. 119) 
 
The place of econometrics and statistical methods in economics is closely re-
lated to the history of the interaction of economics with physics. Furthermore, un-
doubtedly an explicit indicator of this close interaction between economics and phys-
                                                        
4 Here, although it is not clear whether Debreu meant Unified Scientific System (or Encyclopedia) advo-
cated by Vienna Circle or Hilbert’s axiomatic approach, it will be reasonable to accept that he meant the 
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ics manifests itself in the transformation of the name of the discipline from “political 
economy” to “economics”. This change can be seen as an effort to transform eco-
nomics into a science with a higher degree of scientific legitimacy by establishing a 
value-free system of constructing economic propositions, testable hypotheses and 
inferences. The origins of this effort can be traced back to the Unified Scientific Sys-
tem of the Vienna Circle which was an empirical rationalism project directly aiming 
to distinguish science from non-science and to provide logical base to scientific ar-
guments. Moreover, since the 1930s methodological discussions associated with ap-
plicability of Popper’s falsification criterion to economics together with significant 
developments in econometrics can be thought of as an effort to imitate the methodol-
ogy of physics. 
The relationship between economics and physics is closely associated with 
controversies on the relationship between economics and mathematics. In the previ-
ous section we saw that opponents to formalization of economics argue that mathe-
matical physics, rather than pure mathematics, must be chosen as a model for eco-
nomics. In other words, foundations and implications of economic theories must be 
empirically testable. This takes us to the ultimate question: can economics be a sci-
ence like physics? This important and difficult question may be answered satisfacto-
rily by making “archeology of economics”, hoisting stratums of economic thought. 
Moreover, following Mirowski (1989), we may argue that since Adam Smith 
the history of economic thought, especially the evolution of neoclassical economics 
since the 1870s; can be evaluated as “imitation” of physics, not only its methodology 
but also its content, problematic and conceptual framework (Mirowski 1989, p. 357). 
 
“The neoclassicals opted to become scientific by ignoring what the physicists and the 
philosophers of science preached, and to cut the Gordian knot by directly copying 
what the physicists did. There can be no more pragmatic definition of science than 
this: Imitate success.”  
 
Nevertheless, according to Mirowski, although the imitation process (imitation 
of Newtonian physics) was not without problems to begin with in the first place until 
the late nineteenth century, it was almost impossible following for economics to fol-
low several innovations in physics (thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, general 
relativity and chaos theory) during the first three decades of the 20th century. These 
new scientific concepts and innovations, some of which are irreversibility of time, 
explanation of the macroscopic behavior of systems without appeal to underlying 
causes at the micro level, the possibility of universe with no scarcity, are not recon-
cilable with the “hard-core” of neoclassical economics (Mirowski 1989, pp. 386-
394). 
Even though Terence Hutchison (in the 1930s) and Milton Friedman (in the 
1950s) are known as the main representatives of the view that economics must be 
purified from the political and ideological value judgments in order to become a 
positive science and must develop, corroborate and falsify theories by adopting 
methods of physics, the origins of this view can be traced back to the foundation 
years of neoclassical economics, to W.S. Jevons (Jan R. Magnus 1999, p. 55): 
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“The deductive science of Economy must be verified and rendered useful by the purely 
inductive science of Statistics. Theory must be invested with the reality and life of fact. 
But the difficulties of this union are immensely great.”  
 
Jevons's emphasis 130 years ago on the necessity of improving empirical-
inductive dimension and combining it with theoretical-deductive dimension in eco-
nomics must be accepted as an important prediction on the difficulty of this process. 
Sixty years later the Econometric Society was founded in USA aiming to develop 
empirical foundations of economics (or to advance economic theory in its relation to 
statistics and mathematics). One of the main reasons behind the foundation of the 
Econometric Society was that “economics is a science and it has an important quan-
titative side” (Schumpeter 1933, p. 5). Econometric studies initiated in 1933 have 
shown important developments especially in the 1940s and the 1950s by the contri-
butions of the Cowles Commission. Even if econometrics which is generally defined 
as the combination of collecting and analyzing economic data (data analysis and 
measurement), estimating parameters (modeling) and hypothesis testing processes 
and techniques (evaluation and testing) has made significant progress in the last fifty 
years, this development level has been criticized by many econometricians as being 
unsatisfactory (see, David F. Hendry 1980; Sims 1980; Edward E. Leamer 1983).  
Indeed, it is possible to determine some implications about ongoing develop-
ments in econometrics which can be described as a positivist project that aims to 
produce the objective knowledge of truth about human behavior. 
First of all, even if economics is one of the disciplines which have the most 
quantitative characteristics, it is a science in which conducting controlled-
experiments are impossible or very difficult. While in physics and chemistry testing a 
hypothesis is possible by appropriately designed laboratory experiments, economists 
have to rely on mostly non–experimental data (which are generally historical data 
collected by public or private institutions for other purposes) when testing and com-
paring hypotheses. In this sense, there are crucial differences between physics and 
economics regarding the nature of the data they use. Furthermore, economics is dif-
ferent not only from experimental sciences, but also from observational sciences (ar-
cheology, astrophysics, biology and psychology) with respect to the relevant process 
of data collection. While in these disciplines the person who makes observation or 
collects data is the same person who analyzes the data, in economics the two are gen-
erally different (Zvi Griliches 1985).  
According to Professor Hendry, although econometrics is a main innovation to 
improve estimation and forecasting procedures designed for non-experimental data, it 
must prove itself as a science rather than “alchemy” in order to overcome some prob-
lems such as the lack of experimentation (which precludes reproducible knowledge) 
and producing passive forecasts based on extrapolative methods. As a result of this, 
economists have to be aware of the fact that statistical significance is not always 
equivalent to economic significance and have to be aware of the criticisms of Keynes 
in 1940 on Professor Tinbergen’s approach (these criticisms are known as “problems 
of linear regression model”) (Hendry 1980): 
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“using an incomplete set of determining factors (omitted variables bias); building 
models with unobservable variables (such as expectations), estimated from badly 
measured data based on index numbers (Keynes calls this the "frightful inadequacy of 
most of the statistics"); obtaining "spurious" correlations from the use of "proxy" 
variables and simultaneity ; being unable to separate the distinct effects of multicollin-
ear variables; assuming linear functional forms not knowing the appropriate dimen-
sions of the regressors; mis-specifying the dynamic reactions and lag lengths; incor-
rectly pre-filtering the data; invalidly inferring "causes" from correlations; predicting 
inaccurately (non constant parameters); confusing statistical with economic "signifi-
cance" of results and failing to relate economic theory to econometrics.”  
 
In order to overcome the accusation of alchemy, without forgetting the criti-
cisms raised by Keynes, econometrics should bring out more improved test proce-
dures to evaluate the empirical outcomes (Hendry 1980, p. 403): 
 
“The three golden rules of econometrics are test, test and test; that all three rules are 
broken regularly in empirical applications is fortunately easily remedied. Rigorously 
tested models, which adequately described the available data, encompassed previous 
findings and were derived from well based theories, would greatly enhance any claim 
to be scientific.” 
 
Economist Leamer also argues that the state of empirical economics is not so 
promising (Leamer 1983, p. 37): 
  
“This is sad and decidedly unscientific state of affairs we find ourselves in. Hardly 
anyone takes data analyses seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone 
takes anyone else’s data analyses seriously. Like elaborately plumed birds that have 
long since lost the ability to procreate but not the desire, we preen and strut and dis-
play our t-values”  
 
Although the credibility issue of econometricians is related to historical, rather 
than experimental character of data, it is more related with both econometricians’ not 
being transparent about data analysis and estimation procedure and with the“myth 
that scientific inference is objective, and free of personal prejudice”. Professor 
Leamer suggests that “this myth which economists inherited from the physical sci-
ences is utter nonsense”. In addition; 
 
“The false idol of objectivity has done great damage to economic science. Theoretical 
econometricians have interpreted scientific objectivity to mean that an economist must 
identify exactly the variables in the model, the functional form and the distribution of 
the errors. Given these assumptions and given a data set, the econometric method 
produce an objective inference from a data set, unencumbered by the subjective opin-
ions of the researcher. This advice could be treated as ludicrous, except that it fills all 
the econometric textbook. Fortunately, it is ignored by applied econometricians. 
(Leamer 1983, p. 36). 
 
According to Leamer, endeavors to develop an econometric model are not 
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cal theory is used to test the hypotheses of the model. Modeling efforts show that a 
small change in the model or in definition of data changes empirical inferences sig-
nificantly; in other words, empirical results are very fragile. Since economists cannot 
escape from their intuition, opinion and presuppositions they need to emphasize the 
distinction between their beliefs and model results in a more obvious way. On ac-
count of this Professor Leamer suggests that we need to find “more complete” but 
“still economical” way to report the “mapping of assumptions into inferences”. He 
proposes to “develop a correspondence between regions in the assumption space and 
regions in inference space.” By this way, one can report that “all assumptions in a 
certain set lead to same inference or some assumptions in the set lead to radically 
different inferences.” (Leamer 1983, p. 38) According to Professor Leamer unless 
this attitude becomes widespread among econometricians, the practice of economet-
ric modeling will not be able to get rid of the reputation of being “fragile and easily 
breakable”. 
Econometrician Magnus (1999, p. 58) also summarizes the current state of 
econometrics as follows: 
 
“Most econometricians today are more ambitious. They believe that the main objective 
of applied econometrics is the confrontation of economic theories with observable 
phenomena. This involves theory testing, for example testing monetarism or rational 
consumer behavior. The econometrician’s task would be to find out whether a particu-
lar economic theory is true or not, using economic data and statistical tools. Nobody 
would say that this is easy.”  
 
And he asks and (answers): 
 
“But is it possible? (…) [Is there any published paper that contains a test which, (…) 
significantly changed the way economists think about some economic proposition? 
Such a paper, if it existed, would be an example of a successful theory test. [But there 
is no such a paper and] such is the state of current econometrics.” 
 
Another controversial subject in econometrics is related with the use of data 
and modelling. In the first half of the twentieth century, the first approach related 
with business cycles which was developed by Mitchell and Burns, and adopted by 
NBER was descriptive data analysis (correct measurement of variables, choice of 
indicator and graphical demonstration). This approach has focused on the inductive-
empirical side of models or “measurement problem” and has been criticized by the 
Cowles Commission (by Koopmans) as “measurement without theory, which was 
active at Chicago University in the 1940s (Scott Simkin 1999). On the other hand, 
the Cowles Commission, with its “measurement with theory” approach, emphasized 
the importance of theory in econometrical analysis, developed simultaneous struc-
tural equations models which were based on statistical probability theory (Christ 
1994). In this way, theories developed to explain economic structure have been tested 
using statistical data, with the help of methods based on probability theory. The pre-
diction failures of these models, especially in the 1970s, led to development of the 
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1989; Charles I. Plosser 1989). These models emphasize the difference between ob-
servational data and incentives which determine the economic behavior. In real busi-
ness cycles models which are also called “theory without measurement”, the conjec-
tural developments have been calibrated as “stylized facts” and determined the rela-
tionship between variables and conjunctures. Against the calibration models Profes-
sor Sims has developed VAR models (measurement without theory). In these models 
while the necessity of the models as a good description of data has been defended, it 
has been stated that the implications of models which developed as appropriate to 
theory will be invalid (Sims 1980, 1996). Of course this approach was not exempt 
from critics: These criticisms have led to the development of structural VAR models 
and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
From the perspective of 200-250 years of history of economic thought, which may 
well be described as a history of making its theories more acceptable and closer to 
the truth one can definitely reach the conclusion that economics has reached a certain 
level of maturity. Two-hundred and fifty years of history of economic thought may 
well be described as a history of making economic theories more acceptable and 
closer to the truth. From this perspective one can conclude that economics has 
reached a certain level of maturity. Economics has formed a concrete theoretical 
core; it is the only social science awarded the Nobel Prize and its theories cannot be 
underrated from the viewpoint of mathematical rigor and reliability. Moreover, for a 
long time now, the interaction of economics with mathematics and philosophy (of 
science and of morals) has become bidirectional, not one-sided. 
In this respect, we can say that instead of the hegemony of one of the mathe-
matical, empirical (and of course moral or historical which we did not focus in this 
paper) aspects in the process of economic knowledge production, it would be more 
fruitful for economics if economists attempt to simultaneously improve each of these 
aspects. In a sense, this means freeing science (P. Feyerabend) and applying A. 
Smith’s invisible hand to the process of producing science. 
We conclude this paper by stating our approach associated with ontological 
roots of economics which recently have been frequently emphasized:   
Economics, as one of the social sciences dealing with various aspects of hu-
man behavior, should be constructed on three fundamental bases (or relationship di-
mensions):  human-nature relationship, human-human relationship and human-
institutions relationship. 
The first essential ontological root of economics, the human-nature relation-
ship, is best expressed by the traditional definition of economics stated by Lionel 
Robbins (1932, p. 16) in the beginning of the 1930s (which defines economics as 
science studying human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means 
which have alternative uses). Although this definition is generally criticized as reduc-
ing human to an a-social (Robinson Crusoe) maximizing individual, its most impor-
tant aspect is its emphasis on the scarce resources of nature. It is not possible to re-
move the phenomenon of scarcity from economics: considering the availability of the 
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world that we live in, it should not be a significant prediction to say that the human-
nature relationship will gain more importance for economics in the foreseeable future 
within the context of the phenomenon of “scarcity”. 
The second ontological root of economics, the human-human relationship, 
first of all expresses human as a social entity (people are born in a society and a fam-
ily). It is neither possible nor meaningful for a person to provide own needs from 
nature alone. In this sense, purposefully or not, the specialization of people in certain 
areas and the division of labor socialize production and distribution. Besides the allo-
cation of given material resources, this dimension of relationship enlarges the scope 
of economics to the problems of production (reproduction) and distribution (redistri-
bution) (see Hollis and Nell 1975). 
The third ontological root of economics, the human-environment or human-
institutions relationship emphasizes that the economic decision or activity environ-
ment (institutional structure) of an individual is important and people both affect and 
are affected by this structure (Douglass N. North 1990; Ronald Coase 1998). People 
make economic decisions and perform their economic activities in certain institutions 
or through the mediation of certain institutions and this affects the end results. Here, 
institutions should be thought in general terms including specific institutional struc-
tures, rules, customs and traditions.  
We can say that, without these three dimensions, the scope and analysis of 
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